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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Dale Swartz appeals from the District Court's order 
dismissing as untimely his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides 
for the tolling of its one year period of limitation during 
"[t]he time during which a properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending ." See 28 
U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). This appeal requires 
us to interpret the language "properly filed" and "pending." 
More specifically, we must decide whether a petition 
brought under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act 
("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541-9546, is 
"properly filed" and "pending" during the time between the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's ruling and the expiration of 
time for seeking an allowance of appeal from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court when the petitioner did not 
file a timely request for allowance of appeal. We conclude 
that a PCRA petition is "properly filed" and"pending" 





In 1989, appellant Dale Swartz was sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of ten to twenty years after pleading guilty 
to rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. In 1990, 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court. 
Swartz did not seek allowance of appeal from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
In 1993, Swartz sought PCRA relief. On November 1, 
1995, after an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied 
relief. On November 29, 1995, Swartz filed an appeal. On 
April 24, 1996, while the appeal was pending in the 
Superior Court, AEDPA was signed into law. On October 
18, 1996, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court. 
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Swartz did not file a timely petition for allowance of appeal 
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. But, on March 4, 
1997, Swartz filed a "Motion for Permission to File Petition 
for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc." On May 2, 1997, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his motion. 
 
On October 29, 1997, Swartz filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the 
petition to the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. There, the District Court read his petition as 
stating that his judgment became final on November 22, 
1995. It found, therefore, that under Burns v. Morton, 134 
F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998), Swartz had until one year from 
AEDPA's enactment (April 24, 1997) to file his habeas 
petition. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition as untimely 
without consideration of applicable tolling provisions.1 
 
Swartz appealed and submitted an application for a 
certificate of appealability. We granted the certificate of 
appealability on: "whether Swartz's time to file a federal 
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1) was 
tolled under 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2), and, if so, on what date 
did the tolling period end." The District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(a). We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291, 2253. We exercise plenary review 
over the statute of limitations issue. See Jones v. Morton, 




AEDPA places a one-year period of limitation on all 
habeas petitions.2 See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). That period has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It appears that the District Court may have misidentified some of the 
relevant dates, but in fairness, Swartz's habeas petition, especially the 
procedural history, is confusing and incomplete. 
 
2. The relevant section of AEDPA codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d) 
provides: 
 
       (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a n application 
for a 
       writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
       judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 
       latest of-- 
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four potential starting points. See id. In this case, the 
applicable starting point is the date on which the judgment 
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of time for seeking such review, including the 
time for filing a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. See 
Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 337 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 577 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
Swartz's judgment became final well before AEDPA took 
effect. Consequently, he had at least one year from April 24, 
1996 (the date AEDPA took effect) to file his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. See Burns, 134 F.3d at 111. Swartz 
filed his habeas petition on October 29, 1997. But, because 
his PCRA appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court was 
under review at the time AEDPA took effect, his petition 
was not necessarily untimely. The period of limitation was 
tolled from the date AEDPA took effect (April 24, 1996) until 
his "properly filed application" for state post-conviction 
relief was no longer "pending." See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2); 
Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). He 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        (A) the date on which the judgment becamefinal by the 
       conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking 
       such review; 
 
        (B) the date on which the impediment to fili ng an application 
       created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the 
       United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 
filing 
       by such State action; 
 
        (C) the date on which the constitutional right  asserted was 
       initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 
       newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
       applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
 
        (D) the date on which the factual predicate of  the claim or 
claims 
       presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
       diligence. 
 
       (2) The time during which a properly filed appli cation for State 
post- 
       conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
       judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any 
       period of limitation under this subsection. 
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had one year from that date to file his federal habeas 
petition. 
 
The question presented on appeal is what date was 
 831<!>Swartz's "properly filed" PCRA application no longer 
 
"pending:" October 18, 1996 (the date the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court ruled dismissing his petition), November 18, 
1996 (the date his time for seeking allowance of appeal in 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired), or on May 2, 
1997 (the date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 
nunc pro tunc request for allowance of appeal). Swartz 
argues for May 2, 1997. The Commonwealth argues for 
October 18, 1996. But, we conclude that the proper reading 
of the statute favors the alternative date of November 18, 
1996. 
 
A. Does the period of limitation toll during the time between 
       a court's ruling and the timely filing of an appeal or 
       request for allowance of appeal? 
 
As a starting point in our analysis we first look at 
whether a state post-conviction petition is "properly filed" 
and "pending" during the time between the date of one 
appellate court's decision and the petitioner'sfiling of a 
further appeal, thereby tolling the period of limitation. 
Several courts of appeals have considered this question and 
found that the period of limitation does toll during this 
time. See Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Nino 
v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. 
Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Gaskins 
v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (tolling the period of 
limitation, but noting that it would not have altered the 
disposition of the case); Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 811 (2000) 
(tolling the period of limitation although it did not affect the 
ultimate disposition). The holdings in Taylor , Nino, and 
Barnett are rooted in two principles. First,"a contrary 
construction would be antithetical to the entire theory of 
state remedy exhaustion and would inevitably lead to the 
filing of protective federal habeas petitions." Nino, 183 F.3d 
at 1005; see Taylor, 186 F.3d at 561 ("[W]e believe that 
tolling the entire period of state proceedings upholds `the 
principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion 
doctrine.' ") (brackets and citation omitted); Barnett, 167 
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F.3d at 1323 ("We conclude the term "pending" must be 
construed more broadly to encompass all of the time during 
which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of 
state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies 
with regard to a particular post-conviction application."). 
Second, such a construction is consistent with the 
definition of the term "pending." See Nino, 183 F.3d at 
1005-1006; Barnett, 167 F.3d at 1323. 
 
For the reasons discussed in detail in those opinions, we 
find this view persuasive. Tolling the period of limitation 
between the time a state court denies post-conviction relief 
and the timely appeal or request for allowance of appeal is 
consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language 
as well as the firmly rooted principle of state-remedy 
exhaustion. That being established, we turn to the ultimate 
issue in this appeal. 
 
B. Does the period of limitation toll during the time between 
       one appellate court's ruling and the deadline forfiling a 
       timely request for allowance of appeal when a timely 
       request for allowance of appeal is not filed? 
 
To determine whether the period of limitation tolls when 
a timely PCRA appeal is not filed, we again need to ask 
whether the PCRA application is "properly filed" and 
"pending." However, whether the PCRA application was 
"properly filed" is not really an issue in this case. It is clear 
that Swartz's PCRA application was "properlyfiled."3 On 
November 1, 1995, the PCRA court denied Swartz's 
application. On November 29, 1995, Swartz appealed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Lovasz, we addressed the meaning of"a properly filed application" 
which triggers the tolling mechanism of S 2244(d)(2). 134 F.3d at 148. 
We held that a " `properly filed application' is one submitted according 
to 
the state's procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the 
time and place of filing." Id. It is not clear from the statute whether 
the 
term "properly filed application" refers only to the initial PCRA 
application, or whether it also applies to all related applications for 
appeal. Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that an untimely request 
for allowance of appeal is considered not "properly filed," that does not 
settle the issue of whether a previously filed application (or appeal) was 
"pending" during the time a petitioner could have sought review of the 
appellate court's decision. 
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PCRA court's decision. That appeal was denied by the 
Superior Court on October 18, 1996. The question is at 
what point after the Superior Court's decision did the 
appeal cease to be pending. 
 
Thus, we turn our attention to the term "pending." 
"Pending" is not defined in the statute. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 6th ed. P. 1134 (1990) defines "pending" as, 
 
       [b]egun, but not yet completed; during; before the 
       conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; 
       undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. 
       Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action, period 
       of continuance or indeterminacy. Thus, an action or 
       suit is "pending" from its inception until the rendition 
       of final judgment. An action is "pending" after it is 
       commenced by either filing a complaint with the court 
       or by the service of a summons. (emphasis added). 
 
This definition reflects the term's common usage. See 
Deerwester v. Carter, 26 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1082 (C.D.Ill. 
1998). 
 
In Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 
1999), we defined when a judgment becomes final for 
purposes of S 2255. We also took the opportunity to 
consider its meaning in the context of S 2244(d)(1).4 See id. 
at 574 n. 6, 575. We concluded a judgment becomesfinal 
after the time for seeking discretionary review expires, even 
when discretionary review is not sought. See id.  at 575, 
577. Applying the Kapral definition for when a judgment 
becomes final, to the dictionary definition of"pending," 
leads to the conclusion that for purposes of S 2244(d)(2) 
"pending" includes the time for seeking discretionary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the matter before the Court in Kapral technically required 
only the interpretation of what is a "final judgment" for purposes of 
S 2255, we addressed the meaning of "final judgment" as it pertains to 
S 2244(d)(1). See Kapral, 166 F.3d at 574, 575. It has become our 
custom when wading through AEDPA that when we interpret a provision 
which applies to federal prisoners, we will also consider a parallel 
provision which applies to state prisoners, and vice versa. See id. at 574 
n. 6; Burns, 134 F.3d at 113. Since Kapral, we have applied the 
definition of "final judgment" announced in Kapral to S 2244(d)(1). See 
e.g. Morris, 187 F.3d at 337 n. 1. 
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review, whether or not discretionary review is sought. Thus, 
the time between when the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
ruled and the deadline for filing a timely request for 
allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
should toll.5 
 
This interpretation of S 2244(d)(2) also finds support in 
the principle of state-remedy exhaustion. In Mills v. Norris, 
187 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit applied the principle of exhaustion to a 
somewhat similar factual scenario. Mills had filed a petition 
for post-conviction relief before the enactment of AEDPA. 
On August 15, 1996, the trial court denied his petition. 
Four days later Mills filed a notice of appeal with the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, but failed to file the record on 
appeal within the requisite ninety days as provided by 
Arkansas' procedural rules. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
took no action on the appeal. Then, on October 9, 1997, 
Mills filed a federal habeas petition. The issue before the 
Eighth Circuit was, in light of Mills' failure to perfect his 
appeal, on what date did his post-conviction relief motion 
cease "pending." See id. at 882, 884. 
 
Mills argued that the period was tolled until the end of 
the 90 days to perfect his appeal. The State argued that the 
appeal was not pending because Mills failed to timely file 
the record on appeal as required by the appellate rules. 
After reviewing the principles of exhaustion and comity, the 
court concluded: 
 
        In this case, if Mills had filed his federal petition 
       during the ninety days following the filing of his notice 
       to appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We need not delve into the issue whether "pending" includes the time 
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court because that question is not presented by this appeal. Other 
courts have addressed this issue and found that the time does not toll. 
See Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999); Rhine v. Boone, 
82 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir.), pet. for cert.filed, (U.S. October 4, 
1999). 
Their primary reason is that S 2244(d)(2) provides that the limitation 
period is tolled while a petitioner's State post-conviction remedies are 
pending and a certiorari petition is not part of the state post-conviction 
process. See Ott, 1999 WL 796160 at * 2. 
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       federal petition would surely have been dismissed for 
       failure to exhaust state remedies, because there was 
       still time to perfect his state appeal by filing the record 
       with the Clerk of the Arkansas Supreme Court. That 
       being so, we conclude the state postconviction appeal 
       was `pending' for purposes of S 2244(d)(2) until at least 
       November 17, 1996, the end of that ninety-day period. 
       Thus, Mills timely filed his federal habeas petition on 
       October 9, 1997. 
 
Id. at 884. 
 
We find these reasons convincing. If Swartz had 
attempted to seek federal habeas corpus relief while there 
was still time to seek allowance of appeal, the petition 
would automatically be dismissed for failure to exhaust 
state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c) (under AEDPA, a 
habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he 
has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any 
available procedure, the question presented"); O'Sullivan v. 
Boerckel, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1734 (1999) 
(requiring petitioner to seek discretionary review from 
state's highest court to exhaust); Mills, 187 F.3d at 884. 
 
We note that other courts of appeals have reached a 
similar conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Taylor stated that "underS 2244(d)(2) the entire 
period of state post-conviction proceedings, from the initial 
filing to the final disposition by the highest court (whether 
decision on the merits, denial of certiorari, or the expiration 
of the period of time to seek further appellate review), is 
tolled." Taylor, 186 F.3d at 561 (emphasis added) (dicta). 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1999), relying on 
the principle of exhaustion, stated that "[w]e therefore hold 
that a state-court petition is `pending' from the time it is 
first filed until finally disposed of and further appellate 
review is unavailable under the state's particular 
procedures." Id. at 120 (dicta). We recognize that portions 
of these self proclaimed "holdings" in Bennett and Taylor 
are actually dicta. Nevertheless, it appears from the tenor of 
the opinions that those Courts employed broad language in 
interpreting S 2244(d)(2), possibly to instruct the District 
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Courts on the proper tolling procedures. See Bennett, 199 
F.3d at 120 (stating that is has "determined the 
circumstances during which a state-court petition may be 
considered `pending.' "); Taylor, 186 F.2d at 561 (speaking 
in broad terms). 
 
Several District Courts have also read S 2244(d)(2) to 
include the time for filing an appeal even when a timely 
appeal or request for allowance of appeal was notfiled, 
although without much discussion. In Cotto v. Price, No. 
Civ. A. 98-6479, 1999 WL 601129, at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 
1999) (unpublished), for example, the court concluded that 
a PCRA petition is pending until "the date on which the 
time for appealing the . . . denial of [the] PCRA petition 
expired." In that case, the petitioner did notfile a timely 
appeal of the PCRA court's ruling to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court. Instead, he filed a petition for leave to 
appeal nunc pro tunc. In dismissing the petition as 
untimely, the District Court found that because the nunc 
pro tunc appeal was not properly filed it did not toll the 
limitation period, but nevertheless tolled the time during 
which the petitioner could have sought appellate review. 
See id.; see also United States ex rel. Noel v. Clark, 74 
F.Supp.2d 800, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding that the 
"limitations period began to run . . . when the time expired 
for him to seek review in the Illinois Supreme Court of the 
decision on his state habeas petition . . ."); United States ex 
rel. Morgan v. Gilmore, 26 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1038, 1039 
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (where a petitioner failed to file timely 
appeal, limitation period began to run after the time 
petitioner could not longer seek timely appellate review); 
Neal v. Ahitow, 8 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1119-1120 (C.D. Ill. 
1998) ("once a post-conviction relief petition is initially filed 
in State court then that petition is "pending" for purposes 
of section 2244(d)(2) as long as the state court or the state 
post-conviction procedures allow for review."); United States 
ex rel. Fernandez v. Washington, No. 98-C-1332, 1999 WL 
688771 at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1999) (unpublished) (where 
late petition for leave to appeal is granted, time period tolls 
from time intermediate appellate court rules until the time 
for seeking review of that order expires, but not during the 
time the application for permission to file untimely appeal 
is pending); United States ex rel. Jefferson v. Gilmore, No. 
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98-C-3342, 1999 WL 261737 at * 3 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 
1999) (unpublished) ("Jefferson's statute of limitation clock 
did not truly begin to run, however, until thirty days after 
the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court's 
ruling [which denied Jefferson's post-conviction petition.]"). 
 
Without explanation or elaboration the Commonwealth 
argues that Swartz's PCRA application "concluded in state 
court" when the Superior Court ruled.6  We assume that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although dicta in some opinions appear to support the government's 
view, those cases are readily distinguishable. See e.g. Barnett, 167 F.3d 
at 1332; Dreher v. Hargett, 172 F.3d 62 (10th Cir. 1999) (table); Hoggro 
v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
In Barnett, which was cited supra for the proposition that the time 
between the denial of a state PCRA application and the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal is tolled by S 2244(d)(2), the court concluded that the 
term "pending" "must be construed more broadly to encompass all of the 
time during which a state prisoner is attempting, though proper use of 
state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies." Barnett, 167 
F.3d at 1323. Under that rule, Swartz's time forfiling a habeas petition 
arguably should not be tolled because when he failed to file a timely 
appeal he was not "through the proper use of state-court procedures[ ] 
[attempting] to exhaust state court remedies." But, unlike the Bennett 
and Taylor courts, there is no indication in the Barnett court's opinion 
that it considered whether the time for filing an appeal should be tolled 
when the petitioner failed to file a timely appeal. Certainly, the time 
period for filing an appeal is included in the"proper use of state court 
procedure." Moreover, there was no need for the court in Barnett to 
consider that issue under the facts of that case. 
 
Similarly, in Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.4 (10th Cir. 
1998), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in dicta that the 
court may not count the additional time during which a petitioner 
"appealed the denial of his application for state post-conviction relief 
if 
that appeal was untimely. Section 2244(d)(2) requires a court to subtract 
the time only for the period when a petitioner's`properly filed' post- 
conviction application is being pursued." Id.  (citation omitted). It is 
unclear from the quoted language whether the court's dicta was focused 
on only the time the court spent deliberating over an untimely appeal or 
also the time during which appeal could have been sought. We read it as 
applying to only the former and agree that the time during which 
Swartz's nunc pro tunc request for allowance of appeal was pending does 
not toll the statute of limitation. Nevertheless, even though Swartz's 
properly filed PCRA petition was not "pending" for S 2244(d)(2) purposes 
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Commonwealth contends the word "pending" should be 
read to include only the time when a court is actively 
considering a PCRA application or an appeal from the 
denial of PCRA relief; therefore, there is no application 
"pending" during the time which a petitioner could have, 
but did not seek appellate review. 
 
This reading of S 2244(d)(2) is problematic. We cannot 
reconcile it with our view that the period of limitation is 
tolled when a timely appeal is filed. If an application for 
post-conviction relief is "pending" only when it is being 
actively reviewed by a court, then the time between when a 
court rules and a timely appeal or request for allowance of 
appeal is filed should never toll because there is nothing 
actively before the court. For the reasons already set forth, 
reading the word "pending" to discount the time between a 
lower court's ruling and a timely appeal would not be a 
sensible construction of S 2244(d)(2). See Taylor, 186 F.3d 
at 561(rejecting a theory that the period of limitation does 
not toll during the time between a court's ruling and the 
timely filing of an appeal); Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005-1006 
(broadly defining the word "pending" to include the time 
between a court's ruling and timely filing of an appeal); 
Barnett; 167 F.3d at 1323 (same). Because we believe the 
term "pending" must include the time between a court's 
ruling and the timely filing of an appeal, we also believe 
"pending" must include the time during which an appeal 
could be filed even if the appeal is not eventually filed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
during the time his nunc pro tunc request for allowance of appeal was 
pending, the question of whether S 2244(d)(2)'s tolling period includes 
the time in which he could have filed a timely request for allowance of 
appeal still remains. Even if the quoted language is broader and includes 
the time during which appeal could have been sought, it is dicta. The 
Hoggro court had no need to reach that conclusion as the habeas 
petition was timely as a result of the tolling of the limitation period 
between the time the prisoner filed for post-conviction relief and the 
time 
the state district court denied the application. Id. at 1226-1227. 
 
We also note that we have found at least one example of a court that 
has stopped tolling at the time of a lower court's order when no timely 
appeal was taken. See Dreher, supra. But, it did so without 
consideration of the issues presented on this appeal. Moreover, its 
decision to stop tolling at that time had no effect on the outcome. 
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Furthermore, the Commonwealth's view would require a 
prisoner to file a request for allowance of appeal as a matter 
of course in order to protect a future habeas petition from 
the statute of limitation. This could lead to needless 




We hold that the interpretation of S 2244(d)(2) that best 
comports with the language of S 2244(d)(2), the principles of 
exhaustion, and the prevailing view that the statute of 
limitation should toll between the time a court rules and 
the petitioner timely appeals that ruling, is that the period 
of limitation tolls during the time a prisoner has to seek 
review of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision 
whether or not review is actually sought. Swartz's petition 
filed on October 29, 1997 was timely because it was filed 
within one year of November 18, 1996 (the expiration of 
time to seek appellate review). The District Court's 
judgment will be vacated and the case remanded so that 
the District Court can consider whether the claims are 
procedurally defaulted and, if so, whether Swartz can 
demonstrate "cause and prejudice" for any default. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




7. Swartz makes additional arguments: that the one year statute of 
limitation should toll from the time the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
ruled until the time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected his 
request for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc; that the one-year period 
should toll while his request for permission tofile a timely appeal was 
actually before the court; and the one-year period should be equitably 
tolled under Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d 
Cir. 1998). As noted, we read S 2244(d)(2) as tolling the statute of 
limitation during the time Swartz could have sought allowance of appeal. 
Therefore, Swartz's habeas petition is timely, so we need not consider 
these arguments. 
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